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The transport *Indiana* arrived at Manila on November 30 and within a week the regiment was ashore facing the trenches of the Filipino army which practically invested the city. The record of the coming two years, in 271 pages, is one of almost incessant and gallant action, which gives a very high idea of the American soldier's energy and courage. The whole culminates in the extraordinary and picturesque episode of the capture of Aguinaldo, March 23, 1901, which brought to the author a commission as brigadier-general in the regular army.

The book has a large number of admirable illustrations by F. C. Yohn. The only adverse criticism is that there ought to be maps of those parts of Cuba and of the Philippines in which the actions so entertainingly and instructively described took place, and there should be more and fuller dates. "The 14th", for example, particularly when it occurs in a stretch of several pages, is not a date. Barring these comments, the book deserves unreserved praise.

The Relations of the United States and Spain: the Spanish-American War. By FRENCH ENSOR CHADWICK, Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy (Retired). In two volumes. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1911. Pp. xii, 412; vii, 514.)

THESE important volumes constitute a most welcome addition to the literature of the Spanish-American War. They have a peculiar value as being from the pen of an officer of the navy who was not only an active and distinguished participant, in command of a battleship, but who also filled the important and delicate position of chief of staff to Admiral Sampson. The work cannot be accepted as final and definitive, its scope being clearly indicated by the title "documentary history", whence the trained historian can conveniently draw material supplemented by professional comment.

It naturally results that the chapters relative to the operations of the army and of the navy are of unequal historic value. Those which pertain to the North Atlantic fleet are especially full, and may well be considered as authoritative. The volumes are dedicated to Admiral Sampson, and the author, despite evident efforts at impartiality, cannot entirely eliminate the personal and official bias acquired during his war service. Judged by the index, Sampson's services take up one-eighth of the two volumes.

The chapters on ante-bellum conditions admirably portray the situation from both the Spanish and the American standpoints. The preparations of Dewey, the voyage of the *Oregon*, the vacillating policy regarding the ill-fated *Maine*, the plans for blockade, and the unpreparedness of both Spain and the United States are set forth with clarity and forcefulness.

There are few reports that are new to the general public. The most striking is the acknowledgment of the strategic failure, at a critical period, of the naval war board, in not accepting the accurate report of

the army of the arrival of Cervera's fleet at Santiago de Cuba. The discrediting of this report by the naval war board in Washington and by Admiral Sampson at Key West (I. 266-272), renders inexplicable the harsh censure in former years of Admiral Schley for similar disbelief when in receipt of information (I. 289) that Cervera had left Santiago.

Admiral Dewey's achievements at Manila are convincingly set forth as worthy of high acclaim from his countrymen. Generous, if unique action towards a fallen foe was that of Captain Lambertson (I. 201) in permitting and advising the withdrawal of two Spanish regiments from Cavite, without parole or surrender, so as to avoid having "prisoners or incumbrances on shore".

Attention in these volumes centres on the operations of the North Atlantic fleet, particularly in the blockade of Santiago and the destruction of the Spanish fleet. The account of this much-discussed naval battle brings together a large amount of most interesting matter. The figures of Sampson and of his pathetic foil, Cervera, loom large in these pages.

Amusingly enough the spirit of "the recall" enters the work, for in connection with what "may seem small work" to some (I. 146), in picking up Spanish fishing-boats as prizes, Admiral Chadwick advances arguments to show the unsoundness of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States relative to such seizures.

This "documentary history", which purports "to give all important orders, telegrams and reports", is strangely deficient as to the operations of the army. It requires little reflection to recognize that the success of the war involved the occupancy and control of several widely separated countries whose population exceeded nine millions.

Probably the most important omission relates to the Signal Corps, which does not get into even the index of these volumes. It is not alone that the Signal Corps controlled all the cables of the United States, and that it established and operated the cable, telegraph, and telephonic systems abroad, without which the war would have been indefinitely prolonged, but that through circumstances it even affected the crucial campaign.

In the *Report of the Secretary of War, 1898* (vol. I., pt. I., p. 880), the chief signal officer reports that by "his representations he was responsible for the inception of this [Santiago] campaign, which proved to be the turning point of the war". Secretary of the Navy Long says: "All military and naval movements depended upon that point (the presence of Cervera in Santiago Harbor)" (*ibid.*, p. 894).

The "marked instance of a failure [by the navy] in the very basis of successful operations—information" which the author mentions (Chadwick, I. 70), was more flagrantly repeated in its failures to locate Cervera's fleet, the navy being entirely indebted to the army for the news, a matter now of historic, as well as then of national importance.

The Key West cable office (working with Havana), from the middle of April, 1898, to the end of the war, was a military office, managed and

operated solely by officers and employees of the Signal Corps, the latter sworn to secrecy and loyalty. The telegram on which President McKinley acted was an official despatch from Captain (afterwards Colonel) James Allen, received by the chief signal officer in cipher, May 19, given at once to the President, and later by his orders to the secretary of the Navy. Colonel Allen in his official report (*Annual Report*, 1898, Secretary of War, vol. I., pt. I., p. 946) says: "On the morning of May 19 the Spanish fleet under Admiral Cervera was located at Santiago de Cuba. Its presence was at once telegraphed to the Chief Signal Officer . . . [in cipher], and *reported in person to the senior naval officer at Key West.*" How Admiral Crowninshield knows that this cipher despatch was preceded by a private telegram is of interest. If his statements regarding the Helling's despatch are accurate, it was none the less an army message from a military employee who disgracefully violated his oath of fidelity by betraying to a corporation for its use and dissemination a military secret of the highest importance to the nation.

It is enough that, as Chadwick shows, the navy discredited this information and permitted ten days to elapse before it verified the news of Cervera's presence. But as this news resulted in the speedy termination of the war, and as it was purely an army achievement, it is doubly unfortunate that Admiral Chadwick, doubtless through inadvertence, failed to incorporate this report in his work. Such omission cannot fail to cast doubt on other important matters bearing on the co-operative action of the two services.

The character of the work leads inevitably to comparisons between the army and the navy, which unfortunately are not always treated with discretion and fullness. For instance, remarks on the relative health of the two services should have been materially reduced or greatly extended, so that the reader, fully informed, might draw just conclusions. Nevertheless the work is one of marked historical value.

A. W. GREELY.

The Story of a Great Court. By JOHN BRADLEY WINSLOW, LL.D.
(Chicago: T. H. Flood and Company. 1912. Pp. xiv, 421.)

THIS history of the supreme court of Wisconsin from territorial days to the close of 1880, by its present chief justice, has more than local interest. It exhibits the origins of a judicial tribunal under the conditions of frontier life; it portrays the traits and antecedents of characteristic early jurists of the Middle West, some of whom achieved renown beyond state limits, and it deals with several decisions of national importance.

At the outset the author takes note of the fact that Wisconsin's first constitution, which was rejected in 1846 because of other reasons, contained the provision for an elective judiciary and that this provision was retained in the constitution of 1848. Thus it was a pioneer in this sys-